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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: 
LOBBYING AS THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
Heather Gerken* 
NOVEMBER 12, 2011 
Thank you very much for having me. The conference organizers 
asked me to provide you with a little food for thought to go along 
with the more traditional sustenance that they’ve provided. I may 
repeat a few things said in the earlier panels. This will be short and 
sweet, in large part because I left my house this morning at 3:45 A.M. 
and the caffeine runs out in about twenty-five minutes.  
I want to talk a little bit about the future of campaign finance 
reform and the future of campaign finance scholarship in the wake of 
Citizens United. Here I am going to draw upon my own work and the 
work of some of the folks in this room, including Richard Briffault 
and Rick Hasen, so please imagine a properly footnoted law review 
article scrolling behind me.  
I want to make three points. First, I will argue that Citizens United 
has cut off most of the traditional pathways for campaign finance 
reform. Second, I want to talk about the new directions in which this 
development will push us; I will talk very briefly about future reform 
proposals in the campaign finance context, some of which we have 
already talked about today. Finally, I will talk about where I think 
campaign finance should go. Here I’ll argue that, just as brown is the 
new black, lobbying is the new campaign finance. I want to talk a 
little bit about why I think these two areas are going to be tied closely 
together in practice and in theory. I’ll even kick in new a policy 
proposal at the end by way of a party favor: a public finance analog 
for lobbying reform.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 * What follows is a modestly edited transcript of Professor Gerken’s speech. 
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A.  The Dead End for Reform: Taking Money Out of Politics 
 
Let me start with the basic premise of campaign finance reform 
and why I think we may be leaving it behind. The instinct that has 
long undergirded campaign finance reform is to get money out of 
politics. It’s a perfectly sensible idea if you think that money distorts 
political incentives. By that I simply mean that money makes 
politicians pay less attention to average, everyday people and more 
attention to wealthy corporate interests. While I subscribe to this 
perfectly sensible idea, I get off the boat when reformers start to 
make a list of the problems that they associate with money, including 
thirty-second advertisements, special interest groups, and the end of 
deliberation. These lists lead me to suspect that some reform 
supporters just don’t like democracy. What bothers them is not 
money in democracy—it is democracy in democracy. But even if you 
like politics and think elections are ugly and kind of fantastic, you 
can still get on board with the idea that money can distort political 
incentives. 
Whatever you think about the goal of taking money out of politics, 
Citizens United provides the latest, and perhaps the best, evidence 
that this goal is a dead end for reform, at least in the short term. 
While it may be possible to hold onto what exists now (contribution 
limits in particular), reformers are not going to be able to build a new 
McCain-Feingold regime, let alone find more muscular ways to take 
money out of politics, without running headlong into an exceedingly 
skeptical Supreme Court. While I think that McCain-Feingold was 
overall a good development, I think we should admit that the results 
of the “take money out of politics” approach have been 
underwhelming. That is not to say that it is theoretically impossible to 
take money out of politics. But in a system like ours—where 
elections are privately funded, where reform is piecemeal, and where 
public finance is generally not a realistic option—money hasn’t been 
taken out of politics. Donors simply find new, less transparent ways 
to gain influence in the process. Whether you blame that on Buckley 
v. Valeo (the field’s first blockbuster case) or Citizens United, there is 
no place to go.  
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When academics teach students about the history of campaign 
finance, they always start with Buckley. It is the snake in the garden 
of campaign finance Eden. The story we tell is that when the Court 
drew a distinction between expenditures and contributions, it created 
a world in which politicians’ appetite for money would be limitless, 
but their ability to get that money would not be. Political interests 
inevitably looked for loopholes, they inevitably found loopholes, and 
they inevitably drove big trucks of money through those loopholes. 
As a result, the entire reform game became focused on closing those 
loopholes—engaging in the regulatory equivalent of whack-a-mole. 
Either money gets driven into dark corners, where it is hard to track, 
or efforts to regulate start to tread on First Amendment interests—
interests that would be salient even to someone who thinks that much 
of campaign finance regulation is constitutional.  
Now, others will say that it is not Buckley v. Valeo that is the 
problem; it is what the current Court has been doing of late. On this 
view, McCain-Feingold was going to work and in the long term we 
would have been able to close most of the loopholes. Here I do think 
that reformers have a point—although it is not the point that they are 
constantly flogging with the press. Every time you see reformers up 
in front of the press, they say that Citizens United unleashed the 
floodgates of corporate money, that the Supreme Court’s overruling 
of Austin—which is the one case where the Supreme Court invoked 
the equality rational in talking about campaign finance—was the end 
of the world. Here I am with some of the earlier folks on the panel. 
I’m a little skeptical that the ruling on independent corporate 
expenditures is the end of the world. I do think that transparency is 
important, and I would like to see some efforts to fix that problem. 
But we don’t really know whether Citizens United has opened the 
corporate floodgates. And I certainly would have to agree with one of 
the earlier panelists that the parties will find a way to even things out. 
I would be stunned if the Democrats don’t catch up substantially on 
this front next year.  
I do think that Citizens United will be seen as a pivotal point in 
campaign finance, however, because of what it said about the 
corruption rational—a point that Richard Briffault talked about 
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earlier and that I’ve written about in the past. As we all know, when 
Congress regulates in this area, the Constitution requires it to have a 
good reason in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny. Citizens 
United seems to have dramatically cut back on what constitutes a 
good reason for regulation. That is because it substantially narrowed 
the definition of corruption, the rationale that is regularly invoked 
when Congress wants to pass reform. Indeed, while reformers have 
mourned the court’s rejection of Austin and the equality rational, in 
my view the most important line in Citizens United was not the one 
overruling Austin. It is this one: “Ingratiation and access are not 
corruption.” 
For many years before Citizens United, the liberals on the Court 
had gradually expanded the corruption rational to extend well beyond 
quid pro quo corruption (I give you dollars, you give me votes). The 
Court had licensed Congress to regulate even when the threat was 
simply that large donors had better access to politicians or that 
politicians seemed to be too compliant with their wishes. At times, 
the Court even went so far as to say that regulation could be premised 
even on the perception of undue influence or the “cynical assumption 
that large donors called the tune.” That was enough to justify 
regulation before Citizens United. Ingratiation and access were 
corruption, as far as the Court was concerned. This extremely broad 
definition of corruption was very easy to satisfy and very easy to 
invoke when regulating campaign finance. What this meant in 
practice was that you could get almost everything you wanted in the 
campaign finance world without having to invoke Austin, without 
having to use the word equality. Congress need only rely on concerns 
about corruption.  
But Justice Kennedy is not a fool. He was well aware of what his 
colleagues on the Court were doing with the corruption rational, and 
he did everything he could in Citizens United to put a stop to it. 
Kennedy did not say that the Court was overruling these cases, but I 
think under a fair reading of the cases it was. In my view, that part of 
the opinion doesn’t just raise questions about regulations on 
independent corporate expenditures; it raises questions about lots of 
other types of campaign finance regulation, as has been made clear 
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by the lower court decisions that have followed in the wake of 
Citizens United. Richard Briffault has talked about the soft money 
ban. I, too, am a little bit worried that Citizens United might put the 
soft money ban in jeopardy. At the very least, though, I think it is fair 
to say that Citizens United’s ruling on corruption means that it will be 
very hard to pass much more legislation that pursues the traditional 
goal in campaign finance:  taking money out of politics.  
 
B.  New Directions in Campaign Finance Reform 
 
So, where do we go from here now that it is clear that the 
traditional paths of reform are blocked? You might just throw in the 
towel. But the two groups who care most about reform tend to be 
academics (who are paid for life, so we will just keep writing about 
this stuff) and reformers. Reformers are the world’s biggest optimists. 
They have to be, because election reform is the hardest kind of 
reform. Reformers have to convince people that process shapes 
substance. It is incredibly hard to do and, worst of all, the people you 
are trying to convince are usually self-interested politicians. The odd 
thing about election reform is that the people who know the most 
about reform, who care the most about reform, are the politicians 
who oppose the reform and have the power not to pass it.  
So, what are reformers and academics going to do in the wake of 
Citizens United? Rather than focusing on taking money out of 
politics, it seems to me that pragmatic reformers and academics will 
move in new directions. The most promising avenues will involve 
thinking about reform in a different way. That is, rather than trying to 
resist existing political incentives, maybe it is time to figure out how 
to harness them. Harnessing politics to fix politics would require us 
to recognize that money will always be part of the system and to use 
money’s attractions to create the right kind of incentives for 
politicians. The obvious and popular example of this strategy is 
matching rules, which take a twenty dollar donation and turn it into, 
say, a hundred or two hundred dollar donation. While campaign 
finance has always tried to level down by restricting the ability of 
moneyed interests to influence the process, matching rules try to level 
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up by making small donations and small donors worth more in the 
eyes of politicians. They give politicians a reason to reach out to 
middle-class and working-class voters. That strikes me as the right 
kind of way to think about incentives.  
Disclosure and disclaimer rules are also a way of harnessing 
politics to fix politics. Even if we can’t pull money out of politics, 
perhaps we can make it visible in a way that improves our politics. I 
take seriously Richard Briffault’s skepticism about disclosure rules 
that focus on small donors, which may provide too much information 
at too high a price (a point he makes in an unpublished paper entitled 
“Campaign Finance 2.0”). But here I have in mind the kind of 
disclosure rules that would trace large donations and large 
expenditures. Consider a rule that would require any political 
advertisement to identify the top donors for the advertisement. You 
can see that this type of reform works with political incentives, not 
against them. Having big business on your side is usually an 
advantage in an election. But having big business on your side is not 
an advantage in a campaign advertisement. That’s because big 
business types may be the only people who are less popular than 
politicians themselves.  
We all know why shortcuts like disclaimers matter; we are familiar 
with the problem of the low-information voter. We all know that 
voters do not know a huge amount about the fine-grained details of 
policy proposals. So what do they do? They rely on shortcuts—like 
the words “Democrat” or “Republican”—which stand in, in a pretty 
sensible way, for a larger set of policy positions. Shortcuts are what 
enable voters to make sensible policy decisions when they vote. And 
disclaimers and disclosures are shortcuts. They offer a signal to the 
voter about how to process the information in question. As I said, the 
American people do not have that much affection for American 
companies. An advertisement that is very helpful when it is run by 
the Coalition for Clean Energy or the Workplace Safety Consortium 
is not likely to be as helpful when it is sponsored by British 
Petroleum or Massey Coal.  
One of today’s earlier speakers said that, in his view, oil 
companies had an expressive interest: a First Amendment right to 
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send out these ads secretly and not to be held accountable for what 
they say. That seems inconsistent with what eight justices on the 
Supreme Court think that the First Amendment requires. The way 
that the First Amendment works is that people get to push back if you 
say something with which they disagree. It is one thing to say that if 
there is a threat of violence—if someone is going to slash your 
company’s trucks’ tires or throw a brick through your store 
windows—that you are entitled not to have your expenditures 
disclosed. But it’s not clear that it’s a cognizable injury under the 
First Amendment if someone stops buying your company’s product.  
I should say that neither of the ideas that I have talked about thus 
far are new in the world of campaign finance. But I do think it is fair 
to say that, although there has been a small minority of reformers that 
do work in this direction, mostly these have not been the dominant 
way of thinking about reform. In the wake of Citizens United, 
however, these strategies will not just be the dominant game, they 
may be the only game in town (at least until the personnel on the 
Supreme Court changes).  
 
C.  Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance   
 
If one future direction for reform is to think about channeling 
money in useful political directions rather than trying to pull it out of 
the system entirely, the other may be lobbying. Let me just say a few 
words about why I think that lobbying may be the new campaign 
finance.  
Lobbying is strangely neglected by election law scholars. We don’t 
actually write much about lobbying. There is a small and varied 
group doing it, but the subject is largely neglected by the field. Most 
people in the field write regularly about districting, campaign 
finance, and the like, but most of us—myself included—have not said 
a word about lobbying. I can’t remember the last time I saw a 
lobbying panel at an election law conference. It doesn’t even appear 
in one of the two major textbooks that we use to teach our students, 
although Rick Hasen, I am sure, would like me to mention that his 
text book mentions it. I think Richard Briffault may be the only one 
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in our field who has written in depth about the relationship between 
the two areas (in an excellent article in the Stanford Law Review). 
What’s strange about election law’s neglect of lobbying is that the 
relationship between the two is so close in the real world. Lobbying 
and campaign finance work in tandem with one another as interests 
seek political influence. We neglect lobbying even though we 
routinely repeat the mantra, made famous by Sam Issacharoff and 
Pam Karlan, that “money is a hydraulic force and it will always find 
an outlet.” 
I myself prefer the way Michael Kang formulates this problem in a 
piece in the Iowa Law Review. There he argues that it’s politics that 
exercises a hydraulic force. Money is just a visible symptom of the 
hydraulics of political influence. If we think about campaign finance 
in these terms, it is hard to imagine why anyone would neglect 
lobbying. It is the other natural means of seeking political influence. 
As long as lobbying and campaign finance work in tandem with one 
another, we should not study one without studying the other. Both are 
simply different means to achieve the same set of political ends. They 
are not isolated systems that are separate from one another.  
Why, then, do election law scholars spend an inordinate amount of 
time writing about campaign finance, but not lobbying? It can’t be 
because lobbying is not important. We are all familiar with the ability 
of lobbyists to put loopholes into a bill and to soften regulation 
behind the scenes. The market, at least, confirms the importance of 
lobbying. For example, federal reports suggest that federal spending 
on lobbying in 2008 was 3.47 billion dollars—which, you will note, 
was more than the 3.2 billion campaign dollars spent in what was a 
record-breaking election season in 2008. If that doesn’t give you a 
sense of where the smart money goes, I don’t know what will.  
We also can’t explain the neglect of lobbying by asserting that the 
subject isn’t interesting. Indeed, I would argue that it raises exactly 
the same kinds of conceptual questions as does campaign finance. 
Election law is a field that takes the pristine principals of 
constitutional law—the First Amendment, Equal Protection—and 
throws them into the down-and-dirty world of politics. Lobbying fits 
perfectly in such a field. 
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Although lobbying and campaign finance do look to different 
kinds of questions, there are many important similarities. Both 
campaign finance and lobbying regulations are designed to deal with 
the problem of political influence. Both involve similar regulatory 
challenges. It is not just that both regimes raise serious constitutional 
questions, as the First Amendment looms large in both areas. Both 
require us to regulate a shape shifter. In his Iowa Law Review piece, 
Michael Kang has pointed out that in politics we are rarely regulating 
stable legal entities. Instead, what we are trying to regulate is really 
just a loose collection of interests that can take different forms as 
circumstances dictate. Each time the courts and the legislature try to 
regulate one kind of political institution, political entrepreneurs find a 
new way to recreate that institution. Party donors become supporters 
of 527s, and then supporters of 527s become supporters of 501(c)(4)s 
and 501(c)(6)s. You can just see where the trail of money goes as the 
same interests take on different forms. The same thing happens in 
lobbying. When Congress and Obama put some modest lobby reform 
in place, a bunch of lobbyists just deregistered. They are shape 
shifters. We see it in campaign finance, and we see it in lobbying.  
Maybe the reason we neglect lobbying is that, while the problems 
are the same, the plausible solutions are not. As Richard Briffault has 
argued in the Stanford Law Review, campaign finance reform has 
long had a strong egalitarian element to it; we have long tried to 
imagine campaign finance as having an equalizing influence. This is 
not what we do in lobbying. We do not try to ensure that every 
American gets a lobbyist. Lobbying reform, then, focuses almost 
entirely on questions of disclosure and transparency.  
I think that Richard’s description is correct in describing what we 
have seen so far. But he wrote that piece before Citizens United. I 
think that by the time the Court is done with its work in campaign 
finance, his observation may not apply anymore. It may be that, 
going forward, most of the work on campaign finance will also be 
largely confined to disclosure and transparency. The regulatory 
questions will then look even more alike than they do now.  
In fact, we may be there already. After all, the justifications for 
disclosure rules now focus less on the need for congressional 
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representatives to know what is going on with lobbyists—the old 
rational for lobbying—and more on the kind of public-oriented 
justifications that we see in campaign finance. Maybe the 
convergence has already occurred.  
The last reason we haven’t written about lobbying may be that 
there is nothing left to say. I just think that cannot be right. No 
academic ever thinks that there is nothing left to say. At the very least 
we can repeat things that other people have said. To be sure, in the 
lobbying context, we don’t have what is a great gift to academics—
the annual release of a badly written Supreme Court decision to kick 
around. The Supreme Court gives us lots to write about every year. 
But surely we don’t need the Supreme Court to signal that something 
is important.  
Moreover, lobbying plays to the strengths of the field. We spend a 
lot of time thinking about structural problems like this. We spend a 
lot of time thinking about how to translate those pristine principals of 
constitutional law into the down-and-dirty realm of politics. We are 
comfortable with the dilemmas of regulation in this area. We already 
know what happens when foxes guard the henhouse—when you have 
to ask self-interested politicians to reform themselves. We know 
about the risk that partisans will use their public power as legislators 
to pursue private interests—the risk that they will wage war with the 
other party or even within their own party, all the while calling it 
reform. We also know about the risks involved when partisans don’t 
use regulation as a partisan weapon—when all the incumbents can 
agree that what is good for incumbents is good for the world. Indeed, 
the reason that we have bipartisan gerrymanders, where everyone 
gets protected, is probably similar to the reasons why we don’t have a 
lot of work on the lobbying front: the one thing that politicians can 
always agree on is preserving the status quo.  
As I noted before, we are all aware of the challenges involved in 
regulating shape shifters like political parties, special interest groups, 
or lobbyists. We might even imagine pursuing similar solutions in 
these areas of the law. I think this is especially true as disclosure and 
disclaimer rules take on an increasingly prominent role in campaign 
finance. It may be that we can learn something from developments in 
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the lobbying context in thinking about disclosures and disclaimers in 
campaign finance and vice versa.  
Let me just give you two examples. Bruce Cain has already offered 
one such lesson in an edited volume entitled Race, Reform, and 
Regulation of the Electoral Process. There he draws on the lessons of 
campaign finance and makes a suggestion about lobbying reform. He 
says that the usual move for lobbying reform is to give the lobbyists 
who represent moneyed interests less voice. It is a solution that levels 
things down. Cain says that the solution may be to give people more 
voice, to pull people up. It is exactly the kind of solution you see for 
campaign donation matching rules—to give people who are neglected 
more power. Cain suggests that if you are a public interest group that 
meets a certain membership requirement, then your guys will 
automatically become lobbyists and be allowed to work on bills in 
Congress.  
 
D.  The Lobbying Analog to Public Finance 
 
I want to pitch another idea. This one is at such an early stage that 
I am a bit nervous about doing it, but my co-author Alex 
Tausanovitch and I are in the midst of writing it up. The idea is in the 
“does this dog hunt?” stage—our question is whether this article 
writes.  
Alex and I have been trying to imagine the public finance analog to 
lobbying. Our paper begins with a simple question: what exactly is it 
that congressional representatives and legislators get from lobbyists? 
Most assume it’s money. That is where most of the energy in 
lobbying reform goes, so most people worry about the lobbyists who 
bundle. But, as Richard Briffault has pointed out, that is not really the 
problem. Lobbyists are just channeling special interest money. It is 
not the lobbyists’ own money or even the elicit steak dinners and 
baseball tickets that we worry most about. The money we really 
worry about is the money donated by special interest groups. On this 
view, the real problem is the special interest groups, not the lobbyists 
who bundle for them.  
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But lobbyists do more for legislators than just channel money. 
They provide information. Indeed, some believe that the information-
providing function is more important than the money providing 
function. According to political scientists, there are three kinds of 
things that lobbyists will give you: (1) political information (how 
likely is it that this legislation will pass?); (2) electoral information (if 
you vote for this bill, is your constituency going to vote you out the 
next time around?); and (3) policy information (what happens when 
we pass this bill and is there any alternative?).  
How does it work? Because lobbyists can give politicians these 
three crucial kinds of information, they can move their bills forward 
more quickly than bills where this information is not provided. Think 
of it this way: if you are a member of Congress trying to determine 
what bills to pass in the limited time that you have, you will probably 
pass the bills for which you have all of the information that you need 
to pass—where you don’t have to figure out what to do to get the 
legislation drafted.  
Put differently, legislators will take the prefab option. The 
lobbyists provide McLegislation, McTalking Points, and the 
McResearch neatly packaged in a nice bag, along with the equivalent 
of a Happy Meal toy—the all-too-helpful polling research that will 
tell you how things will go in the future. What would you do? You 
would take the McDonalds option. You would take the prefab option. 
Richard Hall and Alan Deardoff call the help lobbyists provide a 
“legislative subsidy.” They say that subsidy often explains why bills 
move forward.  
So, here is the public finance analog. It is very difficult to 
eliminate legislative subsidies; you would run into huge First 
Amendment problems if you tried to stop lobbying of this sort. But 
you can imagine leveling up. You can imagine providing a legislative 
subsidy for those issues where well-heeled lobbyists aren’t there to 
provide that helping hand—where staffers and bosses need the 
McLegislation, the McResearch and McTalking Points, but they 
don’t have them because the well-funded interests are not there to 
provide them.  
12
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There are lots of ways to level up. You could just tell Congress to 
hire more staffers. While that sounds like a great option for 
congressional representatives, you can just imagine the problem. 
Staffers are fungible, and congressional members could just take that 
money and put it into more support for constituent services and the 
like. Moreover, the problem with added staffers is that they are not 
guaranteed to be experts on the relevant subjects, so you might not 
have the right person there at the right time.  
You might try to expand the Congressional Research Service. The 
problem is that while you avoid the diversion of resources problem, 
you will violate the organization’s norm of nonpartisanship, 
something we should value pretty highly. CRS staff members can 
provide certain kinds of information, but not political intelligence. As 
a legislator, however, you need that kind of information to move 
forward.  
Finally, as Alex and I propose, you could fund policy research 
consultants—the people to provide the McLegislation, the 
McResearch and McTalking Points, plus all the politically relevant 
advice a congressional representative could possibly want. We 
already see a ramshackle version of it happening today. I recently 
testified in front of Congress. I was (willingly) being used by 
congressional representatives—doing research for them and 
providing advice on the bill. That is what all academics do. We are 
like unpaid research assistants. That’s the ramshackle version. 
Staffers find the experts in the field, and experts submit testimony. 
But that isn’t really going to do the trick here. Lobbyists provide 
something that is much more far-reaching and much more helpful. 
What we have in mind are researchers who have a more permanent 
status—people who can provide information during the major stages 
of decision-making as well as during the period in which the bill is 
amended.  
If we imagine a market-based solution for funding the legislative 
subsidy—allowing individual members to hire whomever they 
want—we would avoid the really hard constitutional question 
involved here. Often times there is an impulse among academics and 
reformers to want to sort the “good lobbyists” from the “bad 
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lobbyists” or the “public interests lobbyists” from the “corporate 
lobbyists.” I just don’t think that, as a constitutional matter, that is a 
particularly safe thing to do. I’m not even sure if it is the right thing 
to do. Our proposal is just to let congressional representatives hire 
whomever they want. If they want to hire from the oil industry, they 
can hire from the oil industry.  
But why would they? The oil industry is already very happy to 
provide its own legislative assistance to Congress. In fact, I think oil 
executives would far prefer that congressional members consult with 
their guys rather than some independent person that congressional 
members have hired. We think it is quite likely that congressional 
representatives will do what we hope they will do—that they will 
look for expertise where it is not being supplied.  
As I said, the idea is in the kicking around stage and I would 
welcome any solid kicks during the question and answer period. But 
before I close, let me link our proposal back to the larger point here. 
Citizens United, the decisions that preceded it, and the decisions that 
will follow it will block off many of the traditional paths of campaign 
finance reform. That means that campaign finance reform needs to 
move in new directions—with a greater emphasis placed on leveling 
up rather than leveling down, directing money into politically useful 
channels instead of attempting to take money out of politics. This will 
be particularly true as disclosure and transparency become the 
constitutionally safe options for reformers. I think that campaign 
finance and lobbying, which have long been connected in practice, 
will also grow together in theory and in policy. There has long been a 
reason to study the two together. Citizens United simply makes that 
fact much more obvious. Thank you very much.  
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